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ABSTRACT
Smart Environments, such as smart offices, must support multiple
applications that are deployed and managed by different parties.
Smart Environments are ‘always on’ and application software must
therefore be deployed, configured and reconfigured while the sys-
tem is running. Re-configurable component models provide the
basic mechanisms necessary to achieve runtime reconfiguration.
However, in cases with shared component instances, ensuring ap-
plication integrity during 3rd party reconfiguration leads to high
developer effort and disruption. This paper addresses this problem
through Composition-Swapping, an extension of re-configurable
component models wherein state management delegation and ex-
tended component meta-data are used to support component-sharing
and ensure application integrity. We demonstrate that Composition-
Swapping reduces reconfiguration effort and disruption for four
concurrently running applications on a real-world smart office en-
vironment.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.3 [Special purpose and application based systems]: Real time
and embedded systems
Keywords
wireless sensor networks, software reconfiguration, sharing
1. INTRODUCTION
Smart environments embed intelligence and enable context-awareness
using resource constrained Wireless Sensor and Actuator Networks
(WSANs). As multi-purpose sensing infrastructures, emerging smart
environments will host a range of applications that may be man-
aged, deployed and used by different parties [15]. As it is criti-
cal to reduce deployment and administrative costs of sensing in-
frastructures [15, 24], smart environments should be designed to
maximize the number of concurrent applications they can support.
This makes effectively sharing WSAN resources between concur-
rent applications of paramount importance. Smart environments
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are ‘always-on’ and application software must therefore be deployed,
configured and reconfigured while the system is running. To ad-
dress the need for runtime reconfiguration of WSANs, several run-
time re-configurable component models have been proposed, such
as: RUNES [5], LooCI [11] and Lorien [21]. In addition, lightweight
generic re-configurable component models such as OpenCOM [6],
Fractal [4] and OSGi [19] have also been used in WSAN scenar-
ios. These models offer the basic mechanisms to achieve runtime
reconfiguration, but lack appropriate mechanisms to support shared
sensing environments.
Our real-world shared sensing environment, a smart office WSAN,
provides a shared and re-usable platform to sense environmental
conditions and actuate appliances in our research facility. The core
of the smart office is a network of AVR Raven sensor nodes [1],
which offer an 8 bit 16MHz microcontroller and 16KB of RAM.
To enable sharing in such a resource constrained environment, ev-
ery processor cycle, byte of memory and radio transmission must
be carefully considered. Four distinct sensing applications (elab-
orated further in Section 2.2) were incrementally deployed on the
shared infrastructure. This was a process which led to disruptions
and considerable overhead in reconfiguration effort.
One of the main challenges of shared sensing is to allow new
applications to be deployed on the infrastructure without compro-
mising existing applications [15, 24]. In our work we focus on the
integrity of existing applications as a new application is added to
a shared infrastructure. We have analyzed the adverse effects the
reconfiguration of an application may have on co-executing appli-
cations. Where we quantified the disruption, reconfiguration effort
and resource efficiency incurred in the process of ensuring appli-
cation integrity. We define application integrity as the consistent
functioning of an application. Consistent functioning requires that
applications execute in accordance with their specification, with-
out faults due to resource competition or disruptions due to soft-
ware reconfiguration. During reconfiguration we assume no pre-
deployment coordination, thus the deploying party has no a-priori
knowledge about existing applications and needs to gather informa-
tion about existing software compositions using reflective mecha-
nisms.
Two primary classes of approaches have been proposed which
are designed to allow for the safe co-execution of component based
applications in pervasive environments. The first, focuses on of-
fering virtually separated networks leveraging system Virtual Ma-
chine (VM) type of concurrency. As in SenShare [15], where they
use the capabilities offered in the embedded Linux OS to provide
the required isolation between applications. However, this requires
of multiple orders of magnitude more resource than available in
the nodes we target. The second, are those that leverage code-
recompilation based optimization techniques. As in [12], where
at compilation time, application specifications are parsed to find
conflicts. However, this entails a disruptive reconfiguration process
that requires that all potential configuration conflicts be identified
at development time. Furthermore, it requires considerably more
resource than available in the nodes we target.
Based on our experiences with our smart office, we have dis-
tilled three key requirements for resource sharing in WSAN envi-
ronments:
1. Minimize disruption caused during 3rd party reconfiguration
while not restricting component interactions.
2. Minimize reconfiguration overhead in terms of developer ef-
fort (decisions required, commands issued).
3. Minimize runtime resource consumption due to concurrently
executing applications (i.e. CPU, RAM, flash memory, # of
nodes required) by effectively sharing resources between ap-
plications.
To address these requirements, we propose Composition- Swap-
ping, wherein a running instance of a software component is shared
and reconfigured at runtime to support multiple concurrent applica-
tions with different configuration requirements while ensuring ap-
plication integrity. During Composition-Swapping, isolation be-
tween applications is achieved by executing one composition per
time period. To support component-sharing and enable Composition-
Swapping two key extensions are made to re-configurable compo-
nent models. First, state management delegation, allows our soft-
ware framework to isolate and manage component configuration
and coordination on a per-application basis. Second, we extended
component meta-data, to describe performance restrictions and ap-
plication constraints. The former as component annotations and
the latter as configuration meta-data. We demonstrate the benefits
of Composition-Swapping in a real-world smart office infrastruc-
ture, where it (i) eliminates disruption during reconfiguration, (ii)
reduces reconfiguration effort, and (iii) makes more efficient use of
resources.
2. SHARING IN COMPONENT BASED AP-
PLICATIONS
This section first provides basic insight into Component Based
Development (CBD), followed by details on ensuring application
integrity and then a summarized description of common reconfig-
uration challenges. Finally, it highlights the two main causes of
this overhead and disruption. CBD is based on the concept of pro-
viding generic and reusable software building blocks, i.e. compo-
nents1, that can be composed together by third parties into software
compositions in order to form distributed applications. The support
offered by the component runtime is usually limited to the assem-
bly, introspection (i.e. retrieve information) and reconfiguration
of components. Component runtime refers to middleware imple-
mented to provide an execution environment based on a model.
2.1 Ensuring Application integrity
In order to manually ensure the integrity of applications, the de-
ploying party must check three primary issues:
1. There must be no conflicts, between the component configu-
rations of the applications involved, that may lead to faults.
Faults are generated when component output does not com-
ply with the expected data accuracy and timeliness. Accu-
1Component refers to the reusable code base, while component in-
stance refers to the runtime entity instantiated from the code base.
racy refers to the degree in which the reported data corre-
sponds to the observed phenomena. Timeliness refers to the
extent in which the age of the reported data is appropriate for
the task at hand.
2. Given the combined resource demands and the performance
restrictions of the execution environment, applications must
execute in accordance with their constraints. Delay is an ex-
ample of a performance restriction. Delay refers to the time
required, by the different parts of the execution environment,
to complete data acquisition or processing. The execution
environment refers to the software components and hardware
elements invoked during the execution of a software compo-
sition. Application constraints describe the different factors
which may bound resource allocation and component config-
uration. For example, data accuracy and timeliness.
3. During the reconfiguration process, disruption must not oc-
cur. Disruption refers to application down time created by
the interruption of its data-flow.
2.2 Reconfiguration challenges
The objective of this subsection is to highlight some reconfigu-
ration challenges commonly encountered in shared WSANs. Chal-
lenges that often lead to increased effort, disruption and faults. Be-
fore we present theses challenges, we will briefly introduce the four
applications deployed in our smart office. As they will aid in the
exemplification of these challenges and will also provide the reader
with insight into the applications that were used during the evalua-
tion.
2.2.1 Deployed applications
The application deployed were: HVAC, workplace safety, com-
fort and security. We describe each in the following enumeration:
1. The HVAC application was designed to control ventilation
and illumination appliances independently for each desk in
our offices. Actuation is controlled based on personalized
temperature (temp) and light thresholds. Sensing happens
stochastically, i.e. unpredictably, only when the Radio Fre-
quency IDentification (RFID) card of the corresponding em-
ployee is detected.
2. The safety application was designed to identify potential health
risks based upon the filtered and correlated readings from
temp, Carbon Monoxide (CO), methane (CH4) and humid-
ity (RH) sensors (see Fig. 1A). Sensing in this application is
periodic and happens every 7 minutes when a timer expires.
3. The comfort application was designed to determine office
comfort levels based on averaged readings from temp, light,
CO, CH4, RH and sound (dB) in each office. Application for
which sensing should happen every 4 minutes.
4. Finally, the security application is designed to provide ac-
cess control and motion detection, based on RFID and Pas-
sive InfraRed (PIR) motion detection. Application for which
motion detection is only activated if no employees are in the
office.
2.2.2 Reconfiguration challenges
During the deployment of a new application onto a shared WSAN,
there are some challenges that are particularly notable. Primarily
because of the effort, disruption or faults they commonly create. In
the following enumeration we describe these challenges:
1. Identifying potential configuration conflicts under the coexis-
tence of periodic and stochastic interactions. This co-existence
Figure 1: (A) Safety app. (B) Disruption caused during recon-
figuration.
creates a degree of uncertainty in the verification of integrity.
This is the case because the deploying party is not able to
identify nor resolve potential resource contention, as it is un-
known when and if concurrent invocation will happen. Thus
leaving behind the potential for faults and disruption. For
example: in the case of the temperature sensing components
for the HVAC and safety applications.
2. Modifying any running component instance. Modification
made to instances being used, affects all compositions con-
nected to them. An action that potentially leads to disrup-
tion and faults. More so if the strategy of filter insertion is
used to reconcile different configuration requirements. For
example: in the case of our safety and comfort applications,
which share temp, CO, CH4 and RH sensors. Reconcilia-
tion is needed because one app. requires 4 min. sampling
intervals and the other 7 min.. Thus, filter insertion is used
to down sample readings and allow components to be shared
between applications (see Fig. 1B). Disruption is unavoid-
ably caused during the insertion of filters into the composi-
tion and the loss of sensing precision is caused to the safety
application as the new sampling interval is 8 min..
3. Establishing if the planned modifications will adversely af-
fect the integrity of existing applications. There is usually
no explicit and machine parse-able information pertaining to
each application’s constraints. Therefore, detailed software
specifications and in some cases even inter-party coordina-
tion is needed to realize this task.
4. Establishing if the WSAN will support the combined resource
demand. There is usually no explicit and machine parse-able
information pertaining to the performance of both: the appli-
cations involved, and of the execution environment. There-
fore, detailed hardware specification and in some cases even
the component’s source code is needed to complete this task.
2.3 Causes for the reconfiguration overhead
We have described the need to manually ensure application in-
tegrity in order to be able to deploy new applications on a shared
WSAN without compromising existing ones. We have also pro-
vided a summarized description of challenges that commonly arise
during reconfiguration; challenges which often lead to additional
reconfiguration overhead, disruption and faults. To conclude we
enumerate the two primary causes of the reconfiguration effort,
faults and disruption illustrated:
1. Due to a lack of per-application isolation of component con-
figuration and coordination information, any change in con-
figuration or coordination on a shared component instance
affects all compositions using that instance. It is thus neces-
sary to manually ensure application integrity.
2. Due to a lack of application constraint and performance meta-
data, additional documentation (e.g. hardware and software
specifications) and in some cases, inter-party coordination is
needed in order to ensure integrity.
3. RELATED WORK
This section first provides an overview of alternatives for shar-
ing a WSAN. Second, reviews component models applicable in
WSANs, and finally, discusses ensuring application integrity for
component based systems.
3.1 Sharing a WSAN
Research approaches that allow the sharing of sensing infrastruc-
tures can be broadly classified by the sharing strategy they utilize.
These are: network partitioning, virtual WSANs, data-centric and
node-level. In network partitioning, a part of the network is as-
signed to each application, e.g. TinyCubus [17]. Virtual WSANs
offer virtually separated networks on top of shared nodes (using
system VM type support for concurrency), e.g. SenShare [15].
Data-centric approaches present the WSAN as a database, e.g. TinydB
[16]. Node-based approaches leverage node-level concurrency mod-
els, as those offered by threading libraries or process VMs, e.g. [2,
12, 13]. These broad categories vary primarily in the resource effi-
ciency and isolation they provide. Network partitioning requires
node redundancy therefore it is not adequate for smart environ-
ments. Virtual WSANs offer a high degree of isolation and al-
low node sharing but the per node resources required are consider-
ably above those offered by embedded nodes (e..g [15] requires
Linux based nodes with 32MB RAM whereas embedded nodes
commonly have at most 16KB). Data-centric approaches implic-
itly support multi-application scenarios, but they do not support the
dynamics of smart environments [15, 24].
Node-level approaches can be further classified into coarse-grained
and component based (CBD) approaches. Coarse-grained approaches
as Umade [2] support multiple applications by implementing each
application separately as a dedicated coarse grained module. This
leads to a high degree of redundant functionality, which is resource
inefficient (e.g. [2] with 7 KB of RAM runs on average only
2 apps. per node). Furthermore, they do not ensure application
integrity. Approaches based on CBD, as GatorTech [10], due to
componentization, offer the possibility of a higher degree of reuse.
However these offer very limited support for isolation, lack the
meta-data required to ensure integrity and are resource inefficient
(due to redundant component instances). Note: these are all lim-
itations intrinsic to the underlying component model. In the per-
vasive space, stream processing frameworks [13] and code-based
optimization [12], have leveraged component sharing to improve
resource efficiency. However, they do not offer the required isola-
tion or meta-data. Furthermore, they require over 10 times more
resources than available in embedded nodes and only support peri-
odic interactions.
3.2 Re-configurable component models appli-
cable in WSAN
Existing re-configurable models [4–6,11,19,21] have three major
shortcomings, which we elaborate on below.
3.2.1 Resource inefficiency
Stems from the need to rely on multiple instances of function-
ally equivalent and thus redundant component instances to support
concurrent applications. In contemporary models [4–6,11,19,21] it
is assumed that each application will be assembled from dedicated
instances. An assumption which is not appropriate in embedded
WSANs for of two reasons: First, sharing of sensor hardware is
a necessity. As it is cost prohibitive and technically unfeasible to
have dedicated sensors for each application [13, 24]. Second, im-
proved resource control is obtained by mediating concurrent access
to a shared resource using a Singleton instance [9]. Furthermore, in
these models, it is assumed that sensor contention will be properly
managed by the OS. Which is not the case, as WSAN OSes [22]
offer no support to resolve contention over sensors. Instead, these
only provide support to read values at each analog or digital IO
port [1].
3.2.2 Lack of isolation
In current models [4–6, 11, 19, 21] configuration is part of the
internal state of each component instance (in form of parameters)
and coordination (i.e. interconnections and interactions) is part of
the state managed by the component runtime. However, component
configuration and coordination information is not isolated in a per-
application basis, thus any change will affect all connected compo-
sitions. These models are not concerned with per-application isola-
tion because they do not foresee the need to support component-
sharing, which as elaborated in Sec. 3.2.1 is not an appropriate
assumption. Fractal [4] and Ernie [20] provide limited component-
sharing support, as they only allow the sharing of single-configuration
components. This is useful to keep state consistent in cases of con-
current access to actuation components (e.g. controlling a fan).
However, it does not improve reconfiguration or resource efficiency.
3.2.3 Lack of application constraint and performance
restriction meta-data.
In these model [4–6, 11, 19, 21], application constraints are only
implicitly represented through the values assigned to component
configuration parameters and performance restrictions are not rep-
resented at all. Therefore, application developers need access to
hardware and software specifications, and in some cases even inter-
party coordination is needed to ensure application integrity.
3.3 Ensuring application integrity
In mainstream computing, similar integrity requirements, are present
in the dynamic change management, e.g. [14] and adaptive soft-
ware domains, e.g. [25]. However, there are two key differences
between our perspective on integrity and the perspective these ap-
proaches commonly adopt. The first, in our work we focus on the
integrity of existing applications as new applications are added to a
shared infrastructure. Therefore, we consider the adverse effects
the reconfiguration of an application may have on co-executing
applications. Existing approaches commonly focus more on the
safety of transitions as an application moves from one steady-state
to another [25]. Therefore, the focus lies solely on a single ap-
plication and its adaptations. Second, in our work we consider
resource constraints and the issues of resource competition, and
existing approaches generally do not [14, 25]. Component frame-
works, e.g. [6], ease configuration effort due to the reuse of known
configurations, but do not ensure application integrity. In embed-
ded WSANs a simplified approach is used where only structural
integrity is verified, e.g. [18, 21]. This generally only involves a
light-weight mechanism to verify that mandatory component inter-
connections are satisfied before a component can be activated.
4. RESOURCE SHARING FRAMEWORK
The Resource Sharing Framework (RSF) extends re-configurable
component models in order to support concurrently running appli-
cations in shared sensing environments through a process we re-
fer to as Composition-Swapping. Composition-Swapping, allows
application developers to deploy applications which share compo-
nent instances with existing applications, but treat them as if they
are dedicated instances. Therefore, developers are relieved from
the complexity of ensuring application integrity. As discussed in
Section 2, with existing models any modification to the configu-
ration or coordination of a shared component instance affects all
associated compositions (see Fig 1B). On the other hand, now con-
sider Fig. 2A and B, where due to their per-application isolation, the
temp component can have a unique configuration for each composi-
tion without affecting other applications. This isolation is achieved
by executing one composition per time-period2 and swapping com-
position configurations in and out as required, hence Composition-
Swapping. To achieve this, each time a composition is triggered
for execution, the RSF configures the corresponding component in-
stances and prepares the composition’s structure. In order to obtain
higher resource efficiency gains, the RSF supports the sharing of
sensing and data-processing component instances.
Figure 2: Per-application isolation is achieved by Composition-
Swapping.
To elaborate on Composition-Swapping, we discuss its involve-
ment in three phases of the software life cycle:
(A) Development time: The component developer follows a pat-
terned component implementation to enforce state manage-
ment delegation and annotates components with performance
meta-data.
(B) Configuration time: The application developer makes appli-
cation constraints explicit and assembles the application using
the standard mechanisms offered by the component runtime.
(C) Runtime: The RSF realizes Composition-Swapping and en-
sures application integrity.
We delve further into each of these in Sections 4.1 to 4.3 respec-
tively and end with a note on modifiability in Sec. 4.4.
4.1 Development time
The RSF is designed as a modular add-on for existing compo-
nent runtimes and is itself implemented as a standard component.
It is not a programming approach, therefore, applications are still
designed according to the chosen component model. However,
there are two core extensions needed in the implementation of each
shared component: State management delegation and the annota-
tion of component meta-data.
4.1.1 State management delegation
State management delegation allows the RSF to isolate and man-
age component configuration and coordination on a per-application
basis. This idea is inspired by state management in multi-tenant
middleware, e.g. [23]. State management delegation is achieved
by enforcing a patterned component implementation, as shown in
Listing 1. Each component instance interacts with the RSF through
Idelegateand Iexecute.Idelegate allows component instances
to delegate their state to the RSF. In turn, Iexecute allows the RSF
to return their state and control their execution. To achieve delega-
tion, the developer must implement three things:
(i) A call to the delegateToRSF() method (Line 9) from within
2A notion similar to time-slotting, commonly used in OSes [22] to
support the execution of concurrent threads.
the setProperties() method. In this way, every time the appli-
cation developer submits application data through the setProperties()
interface (Line 6), it will be immediately delegated to the RSF.
(ii) The submitContext() method (Line 10), which handles
context occurrences (e.g. detection of an RFID card). For instance
in cases where a component should sense when an RFID card is de-
tected. It must then be delegated with the delegateContextToRSF()
call in Line 11.
(iii) The execute() method (Line 12) contains the component’s
functional code, its configuration and control. In the case of sens-
ing components, a copy() method must also be provided, which
allows the RSF to request a copy of the latest reading.
1 componentType = t y p e ; / / e . g . s e n s i n g , da ta p r o c e s s i n g
2 mutex Ids ; / / IDs f o r a p p l i c a b l e mutex l o c k s
3 o u t p u t T y p e ; / / t o s e l e c t a l g o r i t h m t o check a c c u r a c y
4 pe r fo rm an ce De la y1 = t ime1 ; / / d e v i c e s p e c i f i c
5 pe r fo rm an ce De la y2 = t ime2 ; / / p e r i p h e r a l s
6 setProperties ( c o n f i g u r a t i o n ) {
7 / / D e l e g a t i o n c a l l f o r s u b m i t t e d c o n f i g u r a t i o n
8 / / and t h e a n n o t a t e d meta−da ta .
9 delegateToRSF ( c o n f i g u r a t i o n , componentMetaData ) ; }
10 submitContext ( o c c u r r e n c e ) {
11 delegateContextToRSF ( o c c u r r e n c e ) ; }
12 execute ( p a r a m e t e r s ) {
13 / / C o n f i g u r e how f u n c t i o n a l i t y s h o u l d e x e c u t e .
14 / / E x e c u t e f u n c t i o n a l i t y . }
15 copy ( p a r a m e t e r s ) { }
Listing 1: RSF-shared component implementation template
4.1.2 Component meta-data
The component developer must specify the component type, ap-
plicable mutex locks, output type and the corresponding delays, i.e.
performance restrictions. The component type identifies the type of
functionality implemented by the component (Line 1 in Listing 1),
e.g. sensing, data processing. Mutex locks mediate access to con-
tentious resources which are not externalized through component
instances. For example, as there is only one ADC, it must be shared
by all analog sensors. At runtime, the RSF locks and releases them
when the execution of the corresponding component terminates, to
ensure consistent sharing. The component developer must identify
where locks are necessary from hardware specifications. The ID
of each applicable lock is included in an array (Line 2). She is re-
sponsible for using these IDs consistently, i.e. in all components,
the same ID refers to the same resource.
Output type is used to select the appropriate algorithm to verify
data accuracy and it specifies the characteristics of the data output
for each component. For example, temp, light, RH sensors gener-
ally have noiseless measurements which are steady, thus are type 1,
and use a simple exponential smoothing function for accuracy [3].
For noisy moving values, as those expected from proximity sensors,
a type 2 would be used, which uses a double exponential smoothing
function [3].
Performance meta-data in the form of delay, allows the RSF to
account for the time it takes, each of the involved parts of the execu-
tion environment, to complete data acquisition or processing. The
component developer, must, through the use of technical hardware
specifications ascertain applicable delays caused by hardware ele-
ments and measure component execution time to quantify software
delays. These measurements must cover the total scope of initial-
ization and computation of each component. For example, analog
sensing components must account not only for the initialization of
the sensing hardware but also for peripheral resources used. Periph-
eral resource refer to the secondary resources that are used during
the invocation of a sensor (e.g. the ADC circuitry). These delays
are measured in time and normally in the order of milliseconds.
However, radical variations exist as, chemical sensors with a 24hr.
heatup time (due to chemical substrate) and PIR sensors with a 2
sec. capture time. See a sample implementation of a Temp sensing
component in Listing 2.
1 i n t cT = 1 ; / / 1= s e n s i n g
2 i n t [ ] mIds = { 3 } ; / / 3 = mutex f o r ADC
3 i n t o u t p u t T y p e = 1 / / 1 = s t e a d y n o i s e l e s s measurement
4 i n t Rdevice = 2 0 ; / / m i l l i s e c . s e n s i n g t i m e
5 i n t Rperipheral = 1 0 ; / / m i l l i s e c . ADC r e s e t−t i m e
6 i n t copy ;
7 void setProperties ( char [ ] c o n f i g u r a t i o n ) {
8 delegateToRSF ( c o n f i g u r a t i o n ,Rdevice ,Rperipheral , cT , mIds ) ; }
9 void submitContext ( char [ ] o c c u r r e n c e ) {
10 delegateContextToRSF ( o c c u r r e n c e ) ; }
11 i n t execute ( ) {
12 i n t v a l u e = ReadADC (TEMP_ADC_CHANNEL ) ;
13 copy = v a l u e ;
14 re turn v a l u e }
15 i n t copy ( ) {
16 re turn copy ; }
Listing 2: Example implementation of shared temp component
4.1.3 The differences to non-shared component im-
plementation
The standard (i.e. non-shared) implementation lacks performance
annotations and does not delegate its configuration, control or con-
text occurrences. Therefore, it is responsible for persisting its own
configuration (Line 3 in Listing 3) and controlling its own execu-
tion (Line 4).
1 char [ ] c o n f i g P r o p e r t i e s ;
2 void setProperties ( char [ ] c o n f i g u r a t i o n P r o p e r t i e s ) {
3 / / p e r s i s t c o n f i g . p r o p e r t i e s
4 main c o n t r o l l oop {
5 / / Imp lement o c c u r r e n c e h a n d l e r s and t i m e r s .
6 / / c o n f i g u r e f u n c t i o n a l i t y from p e r s i s t e d s t a t e .
7 / / E x e c u t e f u n c t i o n a l i t y . }
Listing 3: non-shared component implementation template
4.2 Configuration time
At configuration time, the application developer is responsible
for two things. The first, quantifying application constraints, and
the second, the assembly of the application.
4.2.1 Application constraint meta-data
The application developer must, based on application require-
ments, identify and quantify applicable application constraints. This
meta-data is added to the usual component configuration informa-
tion submitted during application assembly. Application constraint
meta-data allows developers to specify additional constraints that
inform the RSF’s allocation and verification processes. In this way
the RSF is able to ascertain the validity of a given configuration un-
der current system conditions. In our smart office we accounted for
accuracy and timeliness. Data accuracy is considered in two ways:
The first is designed to determine the ‘safe’ or appropriate time for
a component to acquire or process data. This procedure, which
is enabled by default for all components, verifies that component
computation is done in accordance with the limitations of the exe-
cution environment. The second, is designed to account for faulty
or noisy sensors. This is an optional verification procedure which
can be activated per application. In our current implementation,
this verification is done using either simple or double exponential
smoothing [3]. For which, the developer needs to submit the alpha
and delta to be used. Alpha indicates how responsive to change the
verification function should be (0 ≥ α ≤ 1). Delta is a percentage
which indicates how close an output value must be to the expected
value, in order for it to be considered accurate (e.g. safety has
ApC_3 = [α =.5,δ = 10%]) . Timeliness, is expressed either
with the time-drift (e.g. comfort has ApC_1 = 5%) or response-time
constraint (e.g. HVAC has ApC_2 = 3 minutes).
4.2.2 Application assembly
The application developer must submit two commands per com-
ponent instance: First, the configuration of each instance is sent di-
rectly to the instance using its setProperties(configuration)
interface (see Fig. 3B step 1). This configuration data is then auto-
matically delegated to the RSF (step 2). Second, coordination in-
formation (i.e. composition structure) for each instance is submit-
ted to the RSF directly using its setProperties(coordination)
interface (step 3). We elaborate further on each step:
Figure 3: (A) RSF node view, (B) Application assembly
Step 1: Configure component The command used is:
setProperties(Set-ID, interaction, interval,
duration, ApCn[ ], Pn[ ])
The submitted data is: (i) Set-ID is a unique meta-data set identifier,
(ii) interaction type: 1 for periodic or 2 for stochastic, (iii) interval,
in the case of periodic interactions it specifies the sample interval
for computation. For stochastic interactions, it specifies the type of
occurrence that will trigger computation, (iv) duration specifies for
how long a configuration is valid, (v) application constraints, (vi)
Parameters[], which inform computation (e.g. high or low pass fil-
tering). For example:
setProperties(001,1,7 min.,31 days, [5%,0,.5, 10%],
0)This commands configures the temp component for composition
001 (i.e. safety app), in a periodic interaction with a sample inter-
val of 7 minutes, during the next 31 days. The RSF should allow
for a time-drift of 5%, and check accuracy using an alpha of .5 and
a delta of 10%.
Step 2: Delegate configuration and meta-data Each submission
triggers the component instance to delegate all the meta-data to the
RSF. This data is persisted in the RSF as a new record in the meta-
data table. Each record represents a software composition an in-
stance is part of. Each instance can delegate multiple meta-data
sets, one for each application where it is being used in. The RSF
then checks for compliance with performance restrictions and ap-
plication constraints (see Alg. 1). First, it establishes if a response-
time constraint has been submitted. Then the RSF checks two
things. First, the submitted configuration against performance re-
strictions. Second, compliance of the response-time constraint.
This ensures that erroneous data will not be generated from in-
voking components in an unready state or non-compliance to app.
constraints.
Step 3: Configure composition structure The command used is:
setProperties(set-ID, thisInstanceID, otherInstance,
Algorithm 1 Initial configuration check
Meta-data is delegated→ check Rj ,ApC2
Establish if there is a response-time constraint.{ApC2 6= 0}
for each restriction do {∀i[1..n] and ∀j[1..t]}
Check every parameter. {check(Pi, Rj)}
for response-time do
Check that interval meets response time.{interval ≤ ApC2}
otherAddress, interfaceType, interactionType)
This data becomes another record in the coordination table. The
data is structured as follows: (i) Set-ID: associates this data to the
component instance configuration, (ii) thisIntanceID: the instance
in question, (iii) otherInstance: in the case of pull interaction, the
other instance is the data-producer and in push interaction, it is
the data-consumer, (iii) otherAddress: network address of the node
where the other instance is instantiated, (iv) type of the interfaces
to connect and (v) interactionType: pull or push. Note that this sub-
mission is made directly to the RSF, in a traditional assembly, this
would have been submitted directly to the component runtime. For
example:
setProperties(001, temp, filter, IP2, Itemp, push).
This command connects the Itemp interface from the temp to the
filter component for composition 001 (i.e. safety app). The filter is
running in node with address IP2 and a push interaction is used.
4.3 Runtime
Composition-Swapping is comprised of three primary steps: com-
position triggered, composition verified and composition swapped.
We describe each of them in Sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.3 respectively.
4.3.1 Composition triggered
As execution is signaled, either by the expiration of a timer (Step
1a in Fig. 4) or a context occurrence (step 1b in Fig. 4), the corre-
sponding composition is selected and its configuration is verified
on-the-fly. As we follow a reactive on-the-fly approach, there is no
need to statistically model each possible interaction (as is needed
in preemptive scheduling). E.g. In our deployment RFID cards are
detected following a normal bell shaped distribution, and employ-
ees walking in an office, follow a Poisson distribution.
Figure 4: Application integrity is ensured during Composition-
Swapping
4.3.2 Composition verified
When a composition is triggered, its meta-data is retrieved and
passed to the runtime configuration verification process (see Alg. 2).
If all required component instances are available and mutex locks
are free, computation is scheduled and application constraints are
checked (∀i[1..RA], (min{ApCi} ≤ tallowed ≤ max{ApCi})). If
constraints are met the Composition-Swap is authorized. If the con-
straints are not satisfied, a composition-drop is executed. Where the
contending composition is no longer considered for a Composition-
Swap and an error event is generated (using Ierror). This compo-
sition will be reconsidered when it is triggered for execution again.
This verification ensures that erroneous data is not generated from
the invocation of a sensor or peripheral resource in an unready state
or due to violations of application constraints.
Algorithm 2 Runtime configuration verification
Composition is triggered→ retrieve meta-Data.
if instances are avail. and mutexes are free then
Schedule execution. {texpected = tnow}
if time-drift ApC1 is respected then
Authorize Composition swap.
else
Composition-drop.
else
Invoke contention management strategy.
In the cases where an instance is busy, the contention manage-
ment strategy is used. The RSF calculates the time when these
instances will be released based on the time each instance started
execution and the total time arising from its performance restric-
tions (trelease = |Ri − (|tnow − tstart|)|).
Sensing components: If allowable time-drift specified allows for
the latest reading to be reused (trelease ≤ Atd). Then a copy is pro-
vided for the contending composition (by invoking Iexecute.copy()).
This not only resolves contention but also reduces energy expen-
diture from additional invocation of sensors [15, 16]. If not, a
composition-drop is executed.
Data processing components: The contending composition is queued
if its constraints will still be satisfied even after waiting for the
release of busy instances (∀i[1..RA], (min{ApCi} ≤ tallowed ≤
max{ApCi})). If its constraints are violated, a composition-drop
is done. Delving further into contention management strategies is
outside the scope of this paper. The reader is directed to [8], where
we discussed alternative strategies, as SLA based prioritization.
Algorithm 3 Contention management strategy
for each busy instance i do
Calculate release time. {trelease = trelease + |Ri −
(|tnow − tstarti |)|}
Schedule execution. {texpected = tnow + trelease}
if instance is a sensing component and time-drift is respected
then
Request a copy of latest reading.
else if instance is a processing component and time-drift is re-
spected then
Queue composition to execute later. {texpected}
else
Composition-drop.
4.3.3 Composition swapped
The swap is comprised of three steps. First, the RSF removes
all previous interconnections to the affected component instances
and then submits the coordination information to the component
runtime in order to assemble the expected composition (Step 3a
in Fig. 4). Second, the RSF completes the Composition-Swap by
configuring each component, applying corresponding mutual ex-
clusion (mutex) locks and finally signaling the instance for execu-
tion (Step 3b in Fig. 4). Third, the RSF monitors the execution
of the composition and removes the corresponding mutex locks as
each component’s delay time expires. In the cases where an ac-
curacy constraint is present, the RSF monitors component output
to check data accuracy. This is achieved by connecting the RSF
to Idata of the component being monitored (Step 3c in Fig. 4).
In this way, every time the component produces data, the RSF, re-
ceives a copy, which it then uses to perform an accuracy check (see
Alg. 4). Idata represents a standard interface used to expose the
component’s functionality. Ierror is used to notify of any viola-
tions to accuracy constraints. The Composition-Swapping process
occurs every time a composition is triggered for execution in the
RSF.
Algorithm 4 Accuracy verification strategy
Data value is received→ retrieve accuracy constraint ApC3.
Set alpha and delta based on the submitted constraints
if outputType = 1 then
Run simple exponential smoothing
if data value is NOT within acceptable delta then
raise corresponding accuracy constraint violation
else if outputType = 2 then
Run double exponential smoothing
if data value is NOT within acceptable delta then
raise corresponding accuracy constraint violation
4.4 Modifiability
Although we consider a performance restriction expressed as
delay, and quality of data based application constraints, generic
enough to be broadly applicable, we did foresee their extension
or modification. Their definitions and corresponding verification
processes (see Sec. 4.2.1 and 4.3.2), are isolated and contained in
pre-defined modifiable locations. As these locations have been de-
signed as adaptability points in the framework, the scope of change
is limited to the interpretation of each restriction or constraint and
the check function used. We refer the reader to [8] for further de-
tails.
5. EVALUATION ENVIRONMENT AND RE-
SULTS
We now describe the environment used for evaluation of the RSF
and its results. We present our evaluation in two parts: reconfigu-
ration efficiency and runtime resource consumption.
5.1 Evaluation environment
Our smart office has been running for over one year, during
which time five reconfiguration scenarios were enacted to deploy/ex-
tended four distinct concurrently running sensing applications (de-
scribed in Sec. 2). Each reconfiguration case is comprised of the
deployment of a new application. The exception lies in cases one
and two, which comprise the initial deployment and extension of
the HVAC application. The infrastructure consists of two different
platforms: 25 AVR raven nodes [1] and 2 Alix gateways. The raven
nodes, have a 20 Mhz CPU, 16Kb of RAM and 128Kb of FLASH
memory. They run Contiki 2.5 OS (consumes 40Kb FLASH and
5Kb RAM) [22] and the LooCI middleware (consumes 25Kb FLASH
and 5Kb RAM) [11], both programmed with C. Contiki provides
support for concurrency, networking and dynamic loading of code,
and LooCI provides the component runtime and handles distribu-
tion concerns. Alixes have 500 MHz CPUs, Linux and OSGi [19].
5.1.1 The benchmark configuration
The smart office design and benchmark implementation was ini-
tially completed using a standard component model, i.e. LooCI.
Detailed logs and records were kept as applications were deployed
and reconfigured on the 25 Raven embedded nodes [1], keeping
track of disruption, developer effort, and resource consumption.
All reconfiguration actions, i.e. commands issued to the LooCI
API, as well as all events generated by the system and runtime per-
formance metrics for each node were logged. Performance metrics
include: dynamic use of stack, heap, CPU3, and MMEM4 memory.
Access to the smart office’s code, configuration files and architec-
tural views used for the benchmark implementation and RSF evalu-
ation can be found at the RSF website (https://code.google.com/p/r-
s-f/wiki/smartOffice) .
Figure 5: Raven nodes equipped w RFID, CH4, actuators, etc.
5.1.2 RSF implementation and evaluation procedure
We replicated the benchmark configuration using the RSF. The
applications deployed for evaluation are functionally identical. We
re-enacted all of the reconfiguration scenarios undergone by the
benchmark deployment: Case 1, temperature control for the HVAC
application is deployed. Case 2, HVAC application is extended
with illumination control. Case 3, workplace safety application is
deployed. Case 4, comfort application is deployed. Case 5, security
application is deployed. We have recorded: disruption, developer
effort, resource consumption, reconfiguration actions and node per-
formance metrics just as we did during the benchmark.
5.2 Reconfiguration efficiency
Reconfiguration efficiency includes developer effort, disruption
and data transmission experienced during reconfiguration. Devel-
oper effort is quantified in terms of the number of decisions re-
quired and commands issued during reconfiguration activities.
5.2.1 Quantifying each evaluation metric
All reconfiguration processes (containing over 1,000 actions),
commands issued and time elapsed, where recorded and averaged.
We quantified disruption in terms of down time, due to interrupted
data-flow, experienced by each application during reconfiguration.
Additionally a set of experiments where prepared in order to fur-
ther refine these averaged results, from which we derived a set
of equations that describe the observed behavior. The number of
decisions required is directly dependent on the possible Configu-
ration Conflicts CC which need to be identified by considering:
for each S shared instance, if any of the configuration parameters
P and any of the performance restrictions R have conflicts with
any application constraint ApC from the RA Running Applica-
tions. CCS =
∑S
l=1(
∑RA
q=1ApCq(Rl + Pl)), thus the number of
Decisions D required to reconcile conflicts in the simplest case is
3CPU measurements with Contiki’s energest module.
4Contiki’s managed dynamic memory module.
D = CCS . In cases where the entire component graph needs to be
understood, e.g. case 4, one must transverse and check all poten-
tial configuration conflicts CC for the entire affected component
graph, not only the shared component instances.
5.2.2 Developer effort and disruption
As can be seen in Fig. 6, there is a considerable decrease in de-
veloper effort and disruption with the use of the RSF after the 5
reconfiguration scenarios. The # of decisions required decreased
by over 79%, and the # of commands needed decreased by over
24%. Zero disruption was experienced with the RSF. While with
plain LooCI, applications experienced 38 minutes of downtime.
Figure 6: RSF decreases effort and disruption.
RSF case: 1 2 3 4 5 Total
# decisions 28 4 5 5 4 46
# commands 156 96 107 107 29 495
disruption(minutes) 0 0 0 0 0 0
ave. deg. sharing 1 2 2 3 1 NA
% shared components 0 25% 21% 39% 31% NA
LooCI case: 1 2 3 4 5 Total
# decisions 24 20 25 153 4 226
# commands 148 108 131 239 29 655
disruption(minutes) 0 9 11 18 0 38
ave. deg. sharing 1 2 2 3 1 NA
% shared components 0 11% 7% 11% 9% NA
Table 1: RSF incurs less reconfiguration effort and disruption.
Breakdown of results for each office per case: Table 1 lists the
results obtained for developer effort, and disruption in each office.
We also list: (i) The averaged degree of sharing, which represent
the number of compositions an instance is shared in, and (ii) the %
of shared instances.
In Case 1, there is no component sharing, the worst case scenario
for the RSF, there is an increase of 14% # decisions, and 5% # com-
mands.
In Case 2, benefits in all dimensions are noticed for the RSF with
a reduction of: 80% in decisions, 11% in commands, and 100% in
disruption. The RSF is sharing 1 sensing and 1 processing compo-
nents per node.
In Case 3, bigger benefits occur across the board because the RSF
shares 2 sensing and 2 processing components per node.
In Case 4, even greater benefits are obtained because this reconfig-
uration requires full introspection scope (see Sec. 2).
In Case 5, there are no measurable benefits as there is no sharing
on either system. The RSF imposes no overhead for effort in the
cases where no sharing is required, once the overhead of the initial
deployment has incurred.
5.2.3 Amount of bytes transmitted
We have measured the amount of bytes transmitted in each of-
fice per case during reconfiguration activities (see Fig. 7). The
RSF achieves a reduction of over 33% (i.e. 87Kb) on the averaged
amount of bytes transmitted. This is primarily due to component
instance sharing in RSF, as no redundant components need to be
deployed.
Figure 7: Fewer bytes transmitted with the RSF
5.3 Runtime resource consumption
Runtime resource consumption is quantified in terms of: foot-
print, performance, processing overhead of the RSF, and the num-
ber of nodes required per office.
5.3.1 Footprint and performance of the RSF
We have measured static footprint and evaluated performance, in
terms of RAM, and FLASH memory usage at runtime:
Footprint: The RSF consumes about 11Kb of FLASH (17% over-
head over OS) and 400b RAM (4% overhead over OS).
Memory: We instrumented our code to provide real-time monitor-
ing traces at 5 min. intervals throughout the deployment. As one
can see in Fig. 8A and B we plotted the averaged results per node.
RAM overhead is compensated for when 25% of the instances are
shared and FLASH overhead is compensated for when 39% of in-
stances are shared. Thereafter maintaining a lower per application
overhead in the use of memory.
Figure 8: RSF proves resource efficiency.
5.3.2 Processing overhead of the RSF
We have measured processing overhead in terms of CPU usage
and the time delay created by RSF interactions with the MCU con-
figured at a speed of 8 MHz:
CPU: We have measured CPU usage using the Energest module
from Contiki (see Fig. 9). The graph plots averaged CPU usage
for all running processes (i.e. Contiki, LooCI, and the RSF) and
also illustrates the portion of this CPU usage that is attributable to
LooCI and to the RSF. This plot was made based on averaged CPU
usage across all nodes at configuration time and runtime. At con-
figuration time, component deployment required 80% of the CPU,
for which LooCI accounts for about 50% and the RSF has no no-
ticeable usage. During component instance configuration, 60% of
the CPU was used, from which LooCI consumes about 18% and
RSF has no noticeable usage. At runtime every time a composition
is triggered for execution, on average 55% of the CPU is used, from
which LooCI has no noticeable usage and RSF consumes under 5%
of the CPU (these are the RSF’s peak processes).
Time delay: The RSF imposes time delays due to the exchange
of two messages between the RSF and each component (each takes
0.07977 milliseconds) and the time incurred during verification pro-
cesses (on average 0.159 milliseconds). We have added and aver-
aged these delays taking into account the variations of composition
size and complexity of computation. The RSF imposes an averaged
delay of .249 ms. A delay which causes no noticeable decrease in
the data accuracy or timeliness for any application.
Figure 9: Low CPU overhead with the RSF.
5.3.3 Fewer nodes required with the RSF
The RSF requires 30% (i.e. 4) fewer nodes per office. In Fig. 10A,
one can see the LooCI component graph, which is functionally
equivalent to one of the RSF component graphs shown in Fig. 10B.
In Fig. 10B, each graph denotes the triggered composition, dur-
ing one time period, for one node after case 4 (it takes six time
periods to activate all six compositions). The criteria used to mod-
ularize functionality is identical for LooCI and the RSF. As a result
of composition-swapping, the RSF requires only 10 components to
achieve what in a standard model requires 17 components. Further-
more, as each Raven node can support a max. of 12 components,
due to limitations intrinsic to the code deployment infrastructure
and EEPROM size, more nodes are required to support the same
functionality. ID-F implements a string matcher used to identify a
user. TrH-F is a threshold filter. TimeF is a down-sampler. AVE is
an averager. FAN and LAMP are actuator controls for ventilation
and illumination.
Figure 10: Component graph for (A) LooCI (B) RSF in 2 time
periods.
6. DISCUSSION
We have demonstrated two extensions to embedded re-configurable
component models, which ensure application integrity and provide
resource efficient co-execution. A fundamental primitive in our de-
sign was to offer ‘add-on’ unintrusive extensions. Thus, two key
features of the RSF design are particularly notable. First, the RSF
itself is implemented as a standard software component and there-
fore can be integrated with existing models without changes to their
supporting middleware. Second, the approach embodied in the RSF
can be applied to any re-configurable component model [4–6, 11,
19, 21]. The RSF only requires that component instances are: per-
sistent, have explicit interfaces and are runtime re-configurable. In
our prior work [7] we have demonstrated RSF implementations for
various interaction models including: synchronous pull, request-
reply interactions using Runes [5], and with asynchronous push,
publish-subscribe interactions using LooCI [11].
Achieving lower processing overheads, with comparable features,
might have been achieved through the use of more intrusive modi-
fications to the component runtime, OS and system drivers. How-
ever, this would lead to cross-cutting code insertions that would
have been hard to maintain. Furthermore, making the extensions
mandatory, even in the cases when component-sharing is not re-
quired by the deployment scenario.
7. CONCLUSION
We have shown that during the deployment of applications on
shared environments, the need to manually ensure application in-
tegrity, causes significant disruption and reconfiguration effort. We
identified the two primary limitations that cause this. First, the lack
of per-application isolation of component configuration and coor-
dination. Second, the lack of application constraint and component
performance meta-data. To address these, we proposed two ex-
tensions to re-configurable component models. Mainly, state man-
agement delegation and extended component meta-data. These ex-
tensions enable component-sharing, which in turn supports Com-
position - Swapping. Finally, we have shown that for our smart
office, Composition - Swapping has: eliminated disruption, low-
ered reconfiguration overhead and lowered resource consumption.
Specifically by reducing, the required decisions by 79%, the com-
mands issued by 24%, and bytes transmitted by 33%. The resource
efficiency of our approach can be seen in terms of the lower per-
app overhead and fewer nodes required. Its runtime use of RAM is
compensated when 25% of the running components are shared. The
RSF consumes at most 5% of CPU and its FLASH memory over-
head is compensated for when 39% of the components are shared.
Acknowledgment
This research is partially funded by the Interuniversity Attraction
Poles Programme Belgian State, Belgian Science Policy, IMEC and
by the Research Fund KU Leuven.
8. REFERENCES
[1] Atmel, Corp. AVR RZ Raven.
[2] S. Bhattacharya, A. Saifullah, C. Lu, and G. Roman.
Multi-application deployment in shared sensor networks
based on quality of monitoring. In IEEE RTAS, 2010.
[3] R. G. Brown. Smoothing, forecasting and prediction of
discrete time series. Courier Dover Publications, 2004.
[4] E. Bruneton, T. Coupaye, M. Leclercq, V. Quéma, and J.-B.
Stefani. The Fractal component model and its support in
Java. Software: Practice and Experience,
36(11-12):1257–1284, 2006.
[5] Costa P, Coulson G, Gold R, Lad M, Mascolo C, Mottola L,
Picco GP, Sivaharan T, Weerasinghe N, Zachariadis,S. The
RUNES middleware for networked embedded systems and
its application in a disaster management scenario. In
Percom07, pages 69–78. IEEE, 2007.
[6] Coulson G, Blair G, Grace P, Taiani F, Joolia A, Lee K,
Ueyama J, Sivaharan T. A generic component model for
building systems software. In ACM Transactions on
Computer Systems, volume 26, pages 1–42. ACM, 2008.
[7] P. del Cid, D. Hughes, S. Michiels, and W. Joosen. Applying
a metadata level for concurrency in wireless sensor networks.
Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience,
24(16), 2012.
[8] P. J. del Cid, D. Hughes, S. Michiels, and W. Joosen.
Evolving wireless sensor network behavior through
adaptability points in middleware architectures. IJDATICS,
2(1):1–13, 08 2011.
[9] E. Gamma, R. Helm, R. Johnson, and J. Vlissides. Design
Patterns: Elements of Reusable Object-Oriented Software.
Addison-Wesley, Boston, MA, 1995.
[10] S. Helal, W. Mann, H. El-Zabadani, J. King, Y. Kaddoura,
and E. Jansen. The gator tech smart house: a programmable
pervasive space. Computer, 38(3):50 – 60, march 2005.
[11] D. Hughes, K. Thoelen, J. Maerien, N. Matthys, P. J. del Cid,
W. Horre, C. Huygens, S. Michiels, and W. Joosen. Looci:
the loosely-coupled component infrastructure. In IEEE
NCA12, 08 2012.
[12] M. Iqbal, M. Handte, S. Wagner, W. Apolinarski, and
P. Marron. Enabling energy-efficient context recognition
with configuration folding. In PerCom, 2012 IEEE, pages
198 –205, 03 2012.
[13] Y. Ju, Y. Lee, J. Yu, C. Min, I. Shin, and J. Song.
Symphoney: A coordinated sensing flow execution engine
for concurrent mobile sensing applications. In SenSys, 2012
ACM, pages 211–224, 11 2012.
[14] J. Kramer and J. Magee. Analysing dynamic change in
distributed software architectures. IEEE Software, 145(5),
oct 1998.
[15] I. Leontiadis, C. Efstratiou, C. Mascolo, and J. Crowcroft.
Senshare: transforming sensor networks into
multi-application sensing infrastructures. In EWSN.
Springer-Verlag, 2012.
[16] S. Madden and W. Hong. TinyDB: an acquisitional query
processing system for sensor networks. ACM TODS, 30(1),
2005.
[17] Marron P, Lachenman A, Minder D, Hahner J, Sauter R,
Rothermel K. TinyCubus a flexible and adaptive framework
for sensor networks. In EWSN05, pages 278–289. IEEE,
2005.
[18] Mottola L, Picco GP, Sheikh S. FiGaRo: fine-grained
software reconfiguration for wireless sensor networks. In
LNCS, volume 2008, pages 286–304. Springer, 2008.
[19] OSGi Alliance, Org. OSGi - The Dynamic Module System
for Java. http://www.osgi.org/.
[20] G. Outhred and J. Potter. A model for component
composition with sharing. In W. Weck, J. Bosch, and
C. Szyperski, editors, Proc. component-Oriented
Programming (WCOP âA˘Z´98), 1998.
[21] B. Porter, G. Coulson, and U. Roedig. Managing software
evolution in large-scale wireless sensor and actuator
networks. ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks,
9(4):1–28, 2013.
[22] Swedish Institute of Computer Science (SICS). The Contiki
OS. http://www.contiki-os.org/.
[23] S. Walraven, E. Truyen, and W. Joosen. A Middleware Layer
for Flexible and Cost-Efficient Multi-tenant Applications. In
Middleware, volume 7049, 2011.
[24] Yu, Y. Rittle, L. Bhandari, V. LeBrun, J. Supporting
concurrent applications in wireless sensor networks. In ACM
Sensys, 2006.
[25] J. Zhang and B. H. C. Cheng. Model-based development of
dynamically adaptive software. In ICSE06, pages 371–380.
ACM, 2006.
